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“Unveiling” Kansas’s Ban on Application of 
Foreign Law* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In January 2012, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Awad v. 
Ziriax upheld an injunction granted by the Western District of Oklahoma 
barring the implementation of Oklahoma’s Save Our State Amendment, 
which “forb[ade] courts from considering or using Sharia” or 
international law.1  Despite the decision in Awad, the Kansas Legislature 
passed a similar bill a few months later intended to ban Sharī’a law from 
“creeping” into the Kansas judiciary.2  On May 21, 2012, Kansas 
Governor Sam Brownback signed into law Senate Bill 79,3 codified at 
article 51 of the Kansas Statutes, concerning the protection of “rights and 
privileges granted under the United States or Kansas constitutions.”4  
Article 51 plainly prohibits “any law, legal code or system of a 
jurisdiction outside of any state or territory of the United States.”5  And, 
under the law, “[a]ny court, arbitration, tribunal or administrative agency 
ruling or decision” basing a ruling “in whole or in part on any foreign 
law, legal code or system” is void and unenforceable as against the 
public policy of Kansas.6  Article 51 bans the application of international 
law in state court proceedings.  The law’s language veils the true intent 
of article 51.  Although not explicit in article 51, the legislative intent 
behind the law was to ban Sharī’a law, otherwise known as Islamic law.7 
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 1.  670 F.3d 1111, 1117–18, 1132 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 2.  Andy Marso, Bill Aimed at Stopping Sharia Law Passes Senate, TOPEKA CAP.-J., May 11, 
2012, http://cjonline.com/news/2012-05-11/bill-aimed-stopping-sharia-law-passes-senate. 
 3.  KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-5101 to -5108 (Supp. 2012). 
 4.  Id. § 60-5101. 
 5.  Id. § 60-5102. 
 6.  Id. § 60-5103. 
 7.  See Marso, supra note 2 (noting that legislators hoped to protect Kansans from Islamic 
law); Andy Marso, Mast Makes Last Pitch for Sharia Law Bill, TOPEKA CAP.-J., May 10, 2012, 
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The fear that international or Sharī’a law is infiltrating the American 
judicial system is not novel.  Congress proposed several bills banning 
federal courts from considering foreign law from 2004 to 2009.8  These 
measures have been driven largely by the fear that the judicial system is 
turning toward international law rather than the Constitution.9  However, 
the cases that spurred this fear were controversial.10  The Supreme Court 
has used foreign law “not because those norms are binding or 
controlling” but to ensure “respected reasoning to support” the Court’s 
decision “with basic principles of decency.”11 
After September 11, 2001, fears of international influence have 
become an unjustifiable fear of Muslims.12  Some Americans have 
unjustly used the terms “Arab,” “Muslim,” and “terrorist” 
synonymously, and relied on pictures of veiled women, bearded men, 
and other false generalizations to demonize the Islamic faith.13  During 
the 2012 Republican presidential primary, candidates Newt Gingrich and 
Michele Bachmann signed a pledge to fend off the “totalitarian control” 
of Islamic law.14  David Yerushalmi, a New York lawyer, has initiated 
proposals in several states to ban Islamic law, attempting to use 
malleable state legislatures to pass anti-Muslim measures.15  Yerushalmi 
                                                                                                                       
 
http://cjonline.com/news/2012-05-10/mast-makes-last-pitch-sharia-law-bill [hereinafter Marso, Mast 
Makes Last Pitch]. 
 8.  See Martha F. Davis & Johanna Kalb, Oklahoma and Beyond: Understanding the Wave of 
State Anti-Transnational Law Initiatives, 87 IND. L.J. SUPP. 1, 3 (2011) (stating that initiatives to ban 
judicial consideration of foreign or international law have been introduced several times in the 
United States Congress and in several states); see, e.g., H.R. Res. 473, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 
Res. 372, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005); Constitution Restoration Act of 
2004, S. 2323, 108th Cong. (2004); Constitution Restoration Act of 2004, H.R. 3799, 108th Cong. 
(2004); Constitution Restoration Act of 2004, S. 2082, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 9.  See Davis & Kalb, supra note 8, at 7–8 (discussing how courts’ citations to international 
law causes some to fear that international law will undermine national sovereignty). 
 10.  See id. (citing Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (life imprisonment for juvenile 
offenders); Roper v. Simmons, 534 U.S. 551 (2005) (juvenile death penalty); Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (gay rights)). 
 11.  Id. (quoting Justice Kennedy in Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034). 
 12.  See generally Yaser Ali, Shariah and Citizenship—How Islamophobia Is Creating a 
Second-Class Citizenry in America, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1027 (2012) (providing an excellent 
background of Islamophobia and its origins and impacts within the Muslim—and those who “appear 
Muslim”—community). 
 13.  See Tariq A. Shah, Islam, Muslims and Terrorism: Secret Evidence and Guilt by 
Association, 10 MICH. ST. U.-DETROIT C. L. J. INT’L L.589, 596–97 (2001) (discussing the “ominous 
turn” of the rise of Islamophobia in America). 
 14.  Andrea Elliott, The Man Behind the Anti-Shariah Movement, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/31/us/31shariah.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 15.  Who’s Behind The Movement to Ban Shariah Law?, NPR (Aug. 9, 2011, 9:30 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/2011/08/09/139168699/whos-behind-the-movement-to-ban-shariah-law. 
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has started two organizations—ACT! for America16 and the Center for 
Security Policy17—to disseminate incorrect messages about Sharī’a 
law.18  Indeed, the exact language used in article 51 is listed on the 
Center for Security Policy’s website as an example for state legislatures 
to utilize during drafting.19 
This Note argues that article 51 is unconstitutional under the federal 
and state constitutions.  While article 51 is not facially discriminatory, 
the intent to discriminate against the practice of Muslims is evident in the 
legislative history.  Article 51 is unconstitutional under multiple clauses 
in the United States Constitution and section 7 of the Kansas Bill of 
Rights.  Furthermore, this Note contends that article 51, with its broad 
and sweeping language, places an unnecessary burden on Kansas courts, 
citizens, and businesses. 
Part II.A provides a brief introduction to Islamic law.  Next, it 
explores the progression of Oklahoma’s Save Our State Amendment, 
Awad, and article 51.  Part III scrutinizes the legislative history and 
ultimate passage of article 51 in the Kansas Legislature and then 
examines its constitutionality.  Part III.C discusses the impact of article 
51 on existing Kansas laws and the resulting burdens on the state’s 
citizens and businesses.  Finally, Part III.D briefly addresses public 
policy concerns. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A. Sharī’a Law 
The history of the life of the Prophet Muhammad, Peace Be Upon 
Him (PBUH),20 the rise of Islam, and the development of Sharī’a law are 
fascinating and complex.  However, only a brief background of Islam 
and Sharī’a law is necessary here.  Sharī’a law, or the Sharī’a, is the 
                                                          
 16.  See generally About ACT! for America, ACT! FOR AMERICA, http://www.actforamerica.org 
/index.php/learn/about-act-for-america (last visited Mar. 13, 2013). 
 17.  See generally About the American Public Policy Alliance, AM. PUB. POL’Y ALLIANCE, 
http://publicpolicyalliance.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2013). 
 18.  Who’s Behind The Movement to Ban Shariah Law?, supra note 15; Elliott, supra note 14. 
 19.  American Laws for American Courts, AM. PUB. POL’Y ALLIANCE, http://publicpolicy 
alliance.org/legislation/american-laws-for-american-courts/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2013). 
 20.  In the Muslim faith, references to the Prophet Muhammad are generally followed with the 
phrase “Peace Be Upon Him”—shortened to “PBUH” in some texts.  See, e.g., RAJ BHALA, 
UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW (SHARĪ’A), at xi (2011).  For brevity’s sake, and for respect of those 
reading, any references to the Prophet or Muhammad refer to the full respectful conveyance of the 
Prophet Muhammad, PBUH. 
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essence of the Islamic faith and where the tenants of the religion are 
encapsulated into the law of a particular state.21  Thus, unlike the 
American legal system, the concept of separate, different religious faiths 
under a secular legal code does not exist in states under the Sharī’a.22  
Sharī’a law is considered a gift from God23 and an instruction for his 
followers’ daily lives.24 
Four sources comprise Islamic law: (1) the sacred text of Islam, the 
Holy Qur’an; (2) sunnah25—traditions, teachings, and practices of the 
Prophet Muhammad—including to some extent, hadiths;26 (3) ijmā’, or 
the consensus of the scholarly community; and (4) qiyās, which are 
analogical deductions and reasoning.  The Qur’an and sunnah are the 
primary sources of Islamic law.27  These two are intertwined primarily 
because of the meaning of the word Qur’an, “to recite.”28  God delivered 
his message—the Qur’an—to Muhammad through Jabreel (Gabriel), the 
Archangel.29  Jabreel would instruct Muhammad to “recite!” and 
Muhammad, although frightened at first, repeated the message back.30  
Muhammad then recited the message to anyone who would listen, for 
many were skeptical of him being a “true” prophet of God.31  
Muhammad found opportunities throughout his life to spread God’s 
message by applying it to everyday life situations,32 the battlefield,33 and 
                                                          
 21.  Id. at xi–xxi. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  “Allah,” translated from Arabic, means God.  Id. at 1391.  Muslims refer to Allah as the 
One True God, the God of the People of the Book (Christians, Muslims, Jews, and perhaps Hindus 
and Shiks).  Id. at 105–08. 
 24.  See id. at 288 (explaining that fiqh, meaning “understanding,” of the divine law found in 
the Qur’ān “is the science of the Sharī’a”); see generally id. at xi–xxii (discussing the “incomplete” 
equation of Sharī’a and Islamic law). 
 25.  “Generally, practice or tradition . . . a precedent, legal custom, legal norm that is 
established by practice, example, decision, dicta, or tradition of the Prophet Muhammad.”  Id. at 
1445–46. 
 26.  “The prophetic tradition, in particular, a saying or account of an action of the Prophet 
Muhammad.”  Id. at 1403.  These formal traditions are narrower than the sunnah.  Compare id. at 
302, with id. at 1145–46; see also JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 34, 69–75 
(1964) (discussing how the Traditionalist movement relied on the hadith of the Prophet). 
 27.  BHALA, supra note 20, at 289. 
 28.  Id. at 292. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. at 35–36, 292–93. 
 31.  Id. at 36–39. 
 32.  See generally id. at 302–03 (explaining that Muhammad taught through his example, his 
word, and the traditions of his close companions and successors, all of which broadly comprise the 
sunnah). 
 33.  Id. at 42–53. 
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even racism.34  Muhammad’s teachings in the Qur’an and his actions—
sunnah—are the “fundamental,” or “classical,” traditions of Islam and 
are considered its primary sources.35 
There is some disagreement regarding the secondary sources of 
Islamic law.36  Not only do different Sunni Muslim schools within the 
Islamic faith (somewhat analogous to the various denominations of the 
Christian Protestant faiths) interpret ijmā’ and qiyās independently, but 
Shiite Muslims do as well.37  Furthermore, a debate over renewed 
interpretation, or ijtihād, has been growing in the Islamic faith.38  Ijtihād 
would allow for Islamic scholars to analogize modern problems arising 
in Islam to the primary sources of Islam.39  This option was “closed” in 
the late 900s.40  However, there is increasing debate that ijtihād should 
be “reopened” to allow Islamic law to become less rigid.41 
Sharī’a law is a guide for how practicing Muslims should live their 
lives.42  Muslims should first follow the teachings of the Qur’an, then the 
sunnah.43  Islamic law is still being codified today based on the past 
authority of the Sharī’a.44  However, it could continue to adjust to 
changing circumstances if Islamic schools were to embrace ijtihād.45  
While codification still exists, the application of Sharī’a law is still 
debated in Islamic countries.46  The Sharī’a can be practiced through 
many different facets, such as marriage customs, charitable giving, 
                                                          
 34.  See id. at 874–76 (providing an account of Bilal, a black African who was subject to racism 
and the Prophet Muhammad’s subsequent “reprimand”). 
 35.  See SCHACHT, supra note 26, at 34 (“[F]ormal ‘traditions’ . . . deriving from the Prophet 
superseded the living tradition of the school.”). 
 36.  See generally BHALA, supra note 20, at 313–22 (discussing the secondary sources of 
Islamic law and the differences among the schools of Islam). 
 37.  Id. at 391, 325–28. 
 38.  Id. at 335. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. at 336; see also SCHACHT, supra note 26, at 69–75 (detailing how the transition of 
“closing” ijtihad impacted the development of Sharī’a law). 
 41.  See BHALA, supra note 20, at 338 (providing argument from Islamic scholar Tariq 
Ramadan on why the gate to ijtihad must be reopened to allow Muslims living in western societies 
to desegregate themselves). 
 42.  See Yasir Qadhi, A Proud, Patriotic, Shariah Practicing American, FAITH IN MEMPHIS 
(Mar. 10, 2011), http://faithinmemphis.com/2011/03/10/a-proud-patriotic-shariah-practicing-
american (“The word ‘shariah’ literally means ‘path,’ and for all Muslims, the shariah is a set of 
ethics and laws they believe will lead them to God’s mercy.”). 
 43.  BHALA, supra note 20, at 304. 
 44.  Id. at 306. 
 45.  Id. at 338. 
 46.  Elliott, supra note 14. 
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inheritance, fasting, and prayer.47  Contrary to what anti-Islamists would 
claim, adhering to any of these practices does not embrace the “medieval 
rules of war or political domination.”48 
B. Oklahoma’s “Save Our State Amendment” and Awad v. Ziriax 
On November 2, 2010, Oklahomans passed the Save Our State 
Amendment (SOSA),49 which provided that: 
[Oklahoma] Courts . . . shall . . . if necessary [uphold and adhere to] the 
law of another state of the United States provided the law of the other 
state does not include Sharia Law, in making judicial decisions.  The 
courts shall not look to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures.  
Specifically, the courts shall not consider international law or Sharia 
Law.50 
Shortly thereafter, Muneer Awad, a citizen of Oklahoma and a 
Muslim, filed a restraining order and sought a preliminarily injunction in 
the Western District of Oklahoma to prevent the certification of the 
election results.51  The court granted the temporary restraining order on 
November 9, 2010, and after an evidentiary hearing, granted the 
preliminary injunction.52 
The Tenth Circuit’s discussion focused on the SOSA’s 
                                                          
 47.  Id. 
 48.  See id. (discussing how following Sharī’a principles does not equate to violence and 
misogyny).  Americans generally are not knowledgeable of the practice of the Muslim faith or its 
relation to Christianity.  In fact, Islam is similar to Christianity.  E.g., BHALA, supra note 20, at 9–19 
(exploring the similarities and differences of Islam and Christianity).  Both Jesus Christ and the 
Virgin Mary are revered in the Qur’an, which also includes a foretelling of the second coming of 
Christ.  See id. at 13, 14–15 (providing a comparative table of Islam and Christianity as well as 
explaining the reverence that Islam has for the Virgin Mary and her son, Jesus Christ). 
[He] said: ‘I am a servant of God.  He has granted me the Scripture; made me a prophet; 
made me blessed wherever I may be.  He commanded me to pray, to give alms as long as 
I live, to cherish my mother. He did not make me domineering or graceless.  Peace was 
on me the day I was born, and will be on me the day I die and the day I am raised to life 
again.’ 
Qur’an, Mary, 19:30–33, at 192 (M.A.S. Abdel Haleem trans., 2004).  Muhammad also valued the 
beliefs and religion of Christians, as evidenced in his “Promise to Saint Catherine’s Monastery.”  
BHALA, supra note 20, at xxv–xxvi.  The Promise allied Christians with Muslims and Muhammad 
and “equated ill treatments of Christians with violating God’s covenant.”  Id. at xxvi. 
 49.  Summary Results: General Election—November 2, 2010, OKLA. ST. ELECTION BD. (Nov. 
2, 2010), http://www.ok.gov/elections/support/10gen.html (indicating that Oklahoma’s Save Our 
State Amendment passed with 70.08% of the vote). 
 50.  Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1117–18 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 51.  Complaint Seeking a Temporary Restraining Order & Preliminary Injunction, Awad v. 
Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 4, 2010) (No. CIV-10-1186 M.), 2010 WL 4455350. 
 52.  Awad, 670 F.3d at 1119. 
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Establishment Clause violations.53  The First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution mandates that “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion.”54  The court’s first task was to 
determine what test applied to SOSA.  While the district court applied 
the Lemon55 test to evaluate Awad’s initial petition, the record was 
“sufficiently developed” to allow the Tenth Circuit to determine if Awad 
had met his burden using the Larson v. Valente56 standard.57  Application 
of Larson provided a better analysis because the SOSA discriminated 
“among religions,” in contrast with application of the Lemon standard, 
which examines whether the law provided a “uniform benefit to all 
religions.”58  SOSA’s language singled out Sharī’a law and “the legal 
precepts of other nations and cultures.”59  The “domestic or Oklahoma 
culture,” conversely, was protected.60  However, both the specific 
mention of Sharī’a and the use of the word “other” discriminated among 
religions.61  Thus, the court applied strict scrutiny.62  The Lemon and 
Larson tests are more fully discussed below in Part III.A. 
The court applied strict scrutiny, which requires that the state have a 
compelling interest and the law have a “close fit” with the state’s 
interest.63  Oklahoma could not identify “any actual problem” that SOSA 
sought to address.64  Nor could Oklahoma provide “a single instance 
where an Oklahoma court had applied Sharī’a law or used the legal 
precepts of other nations or cultures, let alone that such applications or 
uses had caused problems in Oklahoma.”65  Because the state did not 
have a compelling interest, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
injunction.66 
                                                          
 53.  Id. at 1124–32. 
 54.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 55.  403 U.S. 602 (1971); see also infra Part III.A. 
 56.  456 U.S. 228 (1982); see also infra Part III.A. 
 57.  Awad, 670 F.3d at 1127 n.14, 1128. 
 58.  Id. at 1126–27 (quoting Larson, 456 U.S. at 252). 
 59.  Id. at 1129. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. at 1130. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. at 1132. 
1068 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
C. Kansas’s Article 51 
More state legislatures are considering anti-Sharī’a measures.67  The 
American Public Policy Alliance advocates these measures under the 
catchphrase “American Laws for American Courts” (ALAC), and has 
posted model legislation on its website.68  The Florida ALAC 
provision—although not enacted—is almost identical to the model 
legislation and article 51.69  The American Public Policy Alliance, ACT! 
For America, and Center for Security Policy all have pressured state 
legislatures to pass Sharī’a bans.70  While this is reminiscent of the 
Federal Constitution Restoration Acts that Congress tried to pass early 
last decade,71 article 51 passed and is now law. 
Momentum in Kansas to pass a law to effectively ban Sharī’a found 
a spokesperson in Representative Peggy Mast, a Republican from the 
town of Emporia.72  Although not as explicit as SOSA, article 51 caused 
the same worry among Muslim groups when Governor Sam Brownback 
signed it into law on May 21, 2012.73  The bill’s stated purpose was to 
“protect and promote the rights and privileges” of the citizens of 
Kansas.74  Any foreign law, legal code, or system that does not grant “the 
same fundamental liberties, rights and privileges granted under the 
United States and Kansas constitutions” is void and unenforceable under 
the law.75  However, article 51 is inapplicable to legal business entities 
that contract with others and are subject to foreign choice-of-law 
provisions.76  Thus, article 51 only applies to individuals exercising legal 
rights within the state of Kansas. 
The word “Sharī’a” is not used in article 51, nor is there any mention 
                                                          
 67.  See generally Bill Raftery, Bans on Court Use of Sharia/International Law: Showdown 
Vote in Michigan Set for After November Election, GAVEL TO GAVEL (Oct. 4, 2012), 
http://gaveltogavel.us/site/2012/10/04/bans-on-court-use-of-shariainternational-law-showdown-vote-
in-michigan-set-for-after-november-election/ (providing a state-by-state breakdown of the anti-
Sharī’a measures and outcomes). 
 68.  American Laws for American Courts, supra note 19. 
 69.  Compare S. 1294, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011), with American Laws for American 
Courts, supra note 19, and KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-5101 to -5108 (Supp. 2012). 
 70.  See Elliott, supra note 14. 
 71.  See supra notes 8–11 and accompanying text. 
 72.  Marso, Mast Makes Last Pitch, supra note 7. 
 73.  Andy Marso, Brownback Signs Bill That Caused Sharia Flap, TOPEKA CAP.-J., May 25, 
2012, http://cjonline.com/news/2012-05-25/brownback-signs-bill-caused-sharia-flap. 
 74.  KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-5101 to -5108. 
 75.  Id. § 60-5103. 
 76.  Id. § 60-5108. 
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of religion, unlike Oklahoma’s SOSA.77  But several legislators have 
stated that a statutory ban on Sharī’a law was the goal.78  State Senator 
Chris Steineger, a Republican from Kansas City, said that he was 
“inundated [by a marketing campaign of supporters] . . . with materials 
that ‘explain why sharia law is coming and Muslims are trying to take 
over America.’”79  Floor debates drew supporters to “specifically single[] 
out Islamic law, or sharia, as a threat.”80  Proponents of article 51 told 
The Wichita Eagle that article 51 was about “American Law, American 
Courts” and stated in the explanation of the vote in the conference 
committee report that article 51 is “a vote for the maintaining of 
American laws for American courts.”81  This catchphrase and the 
boilerplate bill text indicate the legislature’s purpose for the law.82  There 
is no mystery surrounding where the text of article 51 originated—the 
American Public Policy Alliance.  The anti-Sharī’a purpose of the bill 
was how the group marketed the bill “all session long,” and Senator 
Steineger “[has] all the e-mails to prove it.”83 
III. ANALYSIS 
While the neutral language of article 51 seemingly may not affect a 
majority of citizens, it will affect Kansas Muslims wishing to have 
aspects of Sharī’a law incorporated into their marriage contracts or 
foreign divorce decrees.  Further, the freedoms of individuals to use 
alternative dispute resolution, in particular arbitration, will be hindered.  
Businesses will be unable to utilize Sharī’a-compliant financial services.  
And most importantly, article 51 will preclude Kansas courts from 
understanding all aspects of certain cases when making a decision. 
                                                          
 77.  See id. §§ 60-5101 to -5108. 
 78.  See Andy Marso, Lawmakers Urged to Address Sharia, TOPEKA CAP.-J., April 14, 2012, 
http://cjonline.com/news/2012-04-14/lawmakers-urged-address-sharia (discussing how state senators 
were sent numerous out-of-state emails urging them to pass article 51 and protect Kansas from 
“Islamization”). 
 79.  Marso, supra note 2. 
 80.  Marso, supra note 78. 
 81.  Dion Lefler, Senate Oks Bill to Ban Foreign Laws, WICHITA EAGLE, May 12, 2012, 
http://www.kansas.com/2012/05/11/2332324/senate-oks-bill-to-ban-foreign.html (emphasis added); 
S. JOURNAL, 2011–12, Reg. Sess., at 2700 (Kan. 2012), http://www.kslegislature.org/li/b2013_14 
/chamber/senate/journals/2012/5/. 
 82.  See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text. 
 83.  Lefler, supra note 81. 
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A. Article 51’s Constitutionality After Awad 
Under the United States Constitution, Congress can make no laws 
“respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof.”84  The Establishment Clause provides the basis for finding 
article 51 unconstitutional.  While Kansas may have escaped an obvious 
Establishment Clause violation by not including the word “Sharī’a” in 
article 51, the law’s discriminatory intent is well documented and 
sufficient to violate the Establishment Clause.85  The main purpose of 
article 51 is to prohibit the application of Sharī’a law by Kansas courts.86 
The Supreme Court primarily uses two tests—Lemon and Larson—
to determine whether government action violates the Establishment 
Clause.87  The Tenth Circuit in Awad applied the test set forth in Larson 
to analyze Oklahoma’s SOSA.88  The court found that the Lemon test 
was inapplicable because “the Oklahoma Amendment specifically 
name[d] the target of its discrimination.”89  However, the Lemon test can 
apply, instead of Larson, to legislation that is not blatantly discriminatory 
or unconstitutional.90  For instance, in Hernandez v. Commissioner, the 
Supreme Court held that when a law does not facially discriminate 
among religions, the reviewing court should apply the Lemon test.91  A 
facially neutral law invokes Establishment Clause review when the law 
intends to discriminate or target a certain religion.92 
The Tenth Circuit has adopted Justice O’Connor’s modified Lemon 
                                                          
 84.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 85.  See, e.g., Marso, Mast Makes Last Pitch, supra note 7 (discussing Senator Mast’s concern 
about Islamic law negatively impacting Kansans).  Senator Mast brought in “experts” to discuss 
article 51—an ex-terrorist and a former Marine.  Id.  If article 51 is to really protect the influence of 
foreign laws, then these “experts” are unqualified. 
 86.  See id.  Senator Mast stated she was concerned that, among other things, Sharī’a law would 
dictate custody of minor children in a divorce between Muslims. 
 87.  Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 88.  Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1126–27 (10th Cir. 2012).  Larson held that a law that 
“discriminates among religions, [] can survive only if it is ‘closely fitted to the furtherance of any 
compelling interest asserted.’”  Id. at 1127 (quoting Larson, 456 U.S. at 252). 
 89.  Id. at 1128.  Lemon is applicable to instances where a law provides “a uniform benefit to all 
religions, and not to provisions . . . that discriminate among religions.”  Id. at 1126 (quoting Larson, 
456 U.S. at 252). 
 90.  Indeed, “Larson’s rare use likely reflects that legislatures seldom pass laws that make 
‘explicit and deliberate distinctions between different religious organizations.’”  Id. at 1127 (quoting 
Larson, 456 U.S. at 247 n.23). 
 91.  Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 695 (1989). 
 92.  See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 861 (2005) (“Examination of purpose is a 
staple of statutory interpretation . . . and governmental purpose is a key element of a good deal of 
constitution doctrine . . . .”). 
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test, or “endorsement test,” to measure if the government conduct has the 
purpose or “the effect of conveying a message that religion or a 
particular religious belief is favored or preferred.”93  This modified 
Lemon test further dictates that if the government’s “actual purpose is to 
endorse or disapprove of religion” the government’s action is 
unconstitutional.94  While “a legislature’s stated reasons will generally 
get deference, the secular purpose required has to be genuine, not a 
sham, and not merely secondary to a religious objective.”95 
Lemon is probably the appropriate test to apply to article 51 because 
its legislative purpose, although not its stated purpose, is to advance all 
religions except for Islam.96  The true legislative intent of article 51 has 
been well documented in the press,97 in emails between legislators,98 and 
even in awards handed out to legislators.99 
Senator Mast nurtured the bill in the legislature and was its biggest 
supporter.100  During a news conference about the bill, it appeared that 
Mast’s motivation was to stem the harm caused by Islamic law.101  
Shortly after passing the bill, Senator Mast published a press release that 
gives contradictory explanations of the bill’s purpose.102  In one place, 
the press release states that due to the growing evidence and “concern 
regarding an active campaign to gain public acceptance to Sharia law . . . 
[Mast] decided to act proactively in seeking legislation which would 
guarantee constitutional rights . . . .”103  But, in the next paragraph, the 
press release states that the bill was not a “move against any religion . . . 
but actually a guarantee . . . they have the same protections as every other 
                                                          
 93.  O’Connor v. Washburn Univ., 416 F.3d 1216, 1224 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 94.  Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 95.  McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 864. 
 96.  See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (noting that a bill’s purpose must not be 
to advance or inhibit religion); see also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The 
purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government’s actual purpose is to endorse or 
disapprove of religion.”). 
 97.  See, e.g., Matthew Schmitz, Fears of ‘Creeping Sharia’, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (June 13, 
2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/302280/fears-creeping-sharia-matthew-
schmitz?pg=2. 
 98.  Lefler, supra note 81. 
 99.  Press Release, Peggy Mast, Kansas State Rep., Peggy Mast Awarded 2012 ACT! For 
American National Security Eagle Award, available at http://www.peggymast.com/newsroom.html 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2013). 
 100.  See Marso, Mast Makes Last Pitch, supra note 7. 
 101.  See id. (stating that Mast’s concern was the wellbeing of women and children under Islamic 
law). 
 102.  Press Release, Peggy Mast, Mast Leads on SB 79; Upholds American Law, available at 
http://www.peggymast.com/mast79.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2013). 
 103.  Id. 
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religion or culture in our country.”104  Mast and many of her peers105 
contend that this is a bill for women’s rights, and “women will come to 
Kansas and the U.S. and seek equal protection” because of it.106 
Some other legislators were not persuaded.  Senator Chris Steineger, 
a Kansas City Republican, stated that “the original pitch wasn’t about 
protecting the Constitution, but that Muslims were trying to use sharia 
law to take over the United States and had to be stopped.”107  Senator 
Tim Owens, an Overland Park Republican, believed article 51 to be 
“unconstitutional [and] intolerant.”108 
Further, article 51 avoids an Establishment Clause violation only if 
there is a compelling government interest and article 51 is narrowly 
tailored to that interest.109  Kansas does not have a compelling interest 
because there is no legitimate concern and any concern expressed is 
merely “fictitious.”110  Kansas Senator John Vratil, a Leawood 
Republican, best explained the nonexistence of an Islamic Law 
infiltration in Kansas when he called article 51, “a solution in search of a 
problem.”111  Proponents of article 51 cited a pending divorce case from 
Wichita as proof that Sharī’a law is infiltrating the Kansas courts and that 
the government has an interest in stopping it.112  However, the issue in 
the Wichita case stems from the classification of the nuptial gift of 
mahr,113 a dowry in an Islamic marriage from the groom to the bride, as 
marital or separate property.  Simply, it is a fight over money in a 
divorce proceeding.  Given that the only evidence presented for the 
necessity for the law is a single pending divorce case, a court could 
easily find, as the Tenth Circuit did in Awad, that the law is based on “a 
fictitious governmental interest found nowhere.”114 
                                                          
 104.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 105.  Several state representatives and senators have voiced concerns about “stoning” and other 
atrocities against women and children.  See generally Lefler, supra note 81 (“[Muslims] stone 
women to death in countries that have sharia law.”). 
 106.  Marso, supra note 2. 
 107.  Lefler, supra note 81. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993). 
 110.  See Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1130 n.15 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[T]his court has 
emphasized that ‘[w]e cannot and will not uphold a statute that abridges an enumerated 
constitutional right on the basis of a fictitious governmental interest found nowhere but in the 
defendant’s litigating papers.” (quoting Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 543 F.3d 1245 at 1268–69 
(10th Cir. 2008)). 
 111.  Marso, supra note 2. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  BHALA, supra note 20, at 1421. 
 114.  Awad, 670 F.3d at 1130 n.15 (quoting Weaver, 543 F.3d at 1268–69). 
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Even if the government has an interest in regulating application of 
foreign law in Kansas courts, article 51 is not narrowly tailored to 
achieve this interest, but rather is “broadly written.”115  For instance, 
suppose a Muslim man sets up a will to incorporate principles of the 
Sharī’a with the intention to provide adequately for his daughter.116  
Article 51 would invalidate the will, leaving a grieving family to find a 
more “American” standard by which to distribute assets, even though to 
invalidate the will does nothing to further the government’s purported 
interest of stemming harm caused by application of foreign law in 
Kansas courts.  This indicates that article 51 is not narrowly tailored to 
achieve the government’s interest. 
B. Article 51’s Constitutionality Under the Kansas Bill of Rights 
Section 7 of the Kansas Bill of Rights provides that “nor shall any 
preference be given by law to any religious establishment or mode of 
worship.”117  The Kansas Constitution provides a greater amount of 
protection than the United States Constitution pertaining to the exercise 
of religious beliefs.118  Kansas courts apply the following analysis to 
claims brought under the Kansas Constitution: 
To determine whether government action violates an individual’s right 
to religious freedom we ask: (1) whether the belief is sincerely held; (2) 
whether the state action burdens the exercise of religious beliefs; (3) 
whether the state interest is overriding or compelling; and (4) whether 
the state uses the least restrictive means.119 
The Plaintiff proves her case by proving the first two prongs of the 
inquiry, and then the burden switches to the government to prove that the 
last two prongs are satisfied.120  This test is analogous to the U.S. 
Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause,121 which allows for “freedom to 
                                                          
 115.  Lefler, supra note 81; Liaquat Ali Khan, Kansas Legislature Does Harm in Barring Islamic 
Law, HUFFINGTON POST (May 15, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/liaquat-ali-khan/kansas-
sharia-law_b_1518144.html. 
 116.  The daughter is given first preference of inheritance under Sharī’a law.  See SCHACHT, 
supra note 26, at 170–71. 
 117.  KAN. CONST. bill of rights, § 7. 
 118.  Stinemetz v. Kan. Health Pol’y Auth., 252 P.3d 141, 161 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011). 
 119.  Id. at 160 (quoting Shagalow v. State Dep’t of Human Servs., 725 N.W.2d 380, 390 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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believe and the freedom to act,”122 and the Establishment Clause.123  
Certainly a petitioner who challenged article 51 would satisfy the first 
requirement of a sincerely held belief, as there is little doubt in the 
sincerity of the belief of Muslims.  The second prong, whether the action 
burdens the exercise of religious beliefs, is discussed below in Part III.C, 
particularly regarding Islamic marriages, business and financial 
development, and arbitration. 
The more difficult part of the analysis is whether the state could 
prove that article 51 has a compelling interest and uses the least 
restrictive means.  As stated above, several state senators were skeptical 
about the necessity of the law.  And one Kansas court has called the act 
“superfluous.”124  The court notes “the judiciary [is] already charged with 
protecting constitutional rights.”125  The government cannot demonstrate 
a compelling interest because to do so it must show a necessity for the 
law.  Article 51’s purpose is to promote and protect guaranteed 
constitutional rights.126  But if the judiciary is already charged with this 
task, there is no necessity for an additional law. 
The state also cannot prove that article 51 uses the least restrictive 
means possible.  Even if the government has an interest in regulating 
application of foreign law in Kansas courts, article 51 is not narrowly 
tailored to achieve this interest.127  The law forbids application of “any 
law, legal code or system . . . outside any state or territory of the United 
States” in a court decision.128  Further, any judgment entered by “any 
court” that relies on “any foreign law, legal code or system” that does not 
“protect and promote” the same rights found in the Kansas Constitution 
is invalid.129  Contractual provisions that allow for a foreign law to 
govern disputes between parties invalidate the contract, or provision.130  
Such sweeping language that invalidates court judgments, arbitrations, 
and contracts based on a nonexhaustive list of guaranteed rights found in 
the Kansas and United States Constitutions cannot be the “least 
restrictive” means. 
                                                          
 122.  See Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940) (explaining that the Free Exercise 
Clause protects conduct that is religiously motivated). 
 123.  See supra notes 106–16 and accompanying text. 
 124.  Soleimani v. Soleimani, No. 11CV4668, 30 n.11 (Johnson Cnty. Kan. 2012), available at 
www.volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/soleimani.pdf. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5101 (Supp. 2012). 
 127.  Lefler, supra note 81; Ali Khan, supra note 15. 
 128.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5102 to -5103. 
 129.  Id. § 60-5103. 
 130.  Id. § 60-5104. 
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C. Article 51’s Impact on Islamic Practices and Traditions Within the 
United States and Kansas 
Article 51’s potential legal impact on common Islamic practices is 
significant.  As already noted, Muslims incorporate the Sharī’a as a guide 
to how to live their everyday lives.131  Article 51 unfairly impacts the 
way Muslims can incorporate the tenants of the Sharī’a into their 
marriages and in their personal and professional finances.  Further, 
article 51 usurps federal law pertaining to Islamic arbitrations of business 
or financial disputes.  The following examples illustrate the potential 
legal consequences of the law. 
1. Marriage and Divorce 
Generally, Kansas courts recognize as valid marriages contracted for 
outside of the state.132  However, Kansas does not recognize marriages 
that violate the public policy of the state.133  Under Sharī’a law, however, 
a marriage is a contract between the wife and husband.134  It is an open 
question whether article 51’s declaration that contracts based in whole or 
in part on foreign law “violate the public policy of this state”135 
invalidates foreign marriages. 
It is also uncertain whether and to what extent a court would 
determine a marriage contract or contract between individuals is based 
on a “foreign law, legal code or system,”136 and then how fundamental 
liberties compare between the two legal systems.137  To begin, a court 
would have to investigate and compare several constitutional provisions 
of the country where the foreign contract was made to determine the 
validity of the marriage.  The court would then have to decide if that 
particular country’s laws grant the same “fundamental liberties, rights 
and privileges granted under the United States and Kansas constitutions, 
including but not limited to, equal protection, due process, free exercise 
of religion, freedom of speech or press, and any right of privacy or 
                                                          
 131.  See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 132.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2508. 
 133.  See id. 
 134.  BHALA, supra note 20, at 866. 
 135.  KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-5104. 
 136.  Id. § 60-5104. 
 137.  See AM. BAR ASS’N, RES. 113A, at 9 (2011), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam 
/aba/directories/policy/2011_am_113a.pdf (discussing the absence of a standard for courts to 
compare laws between jurisdictions). 
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marriage.”138  The court would then apply Kansas law if this 
nonexhaustive list is not satisfied.  And then the court could perhaps find 
the marriage invalid. 
For example, suppose H and W marry in Malaysia or Saudi Arabia, 
or any country that incorporates Sharī’a.  Under Sharī’a law, a marriage 
is a contract between the wife and husband.139  H and W then move to 
Kansas and want a divorce.  Under article 51, “the contract mutually 
agreed upon shall violate the public policy of this state and be void and 
unenforceable.”140  Because both countries are “jurisdiction[s] outside of 
any state or territory of the United States,”141 the deciding court must 
examine the laws of the foreign country to ensure the same rights granted 
to Kansas citizens are present in the foreign system.142  Alternatively, the 
court could simply find that the country incorporates aspects of Islam 
into its laws and determine therefore that the marriage is invalid as a 
violation of public policy. 
Kansas courts should be able to determine the validity of marriages 
regardless of whether foreign law is incorporated into the marriage 
contract.  The Sixth Circuit examined an Islamic marriage in Hassan v. 
Holder,143 in which a Muslim emigrated from Israel on a visa and had to 
prove his marriage status to obtain citizenship.144  The court addressed 
whether a valid Islamic marriage occurred in Israel before the Muslim 
entered the country.145  The evidence did not convince the court that a 
valid marriage occurred.146  Rather, the court found that the “steps” 
required for a valid Islamic marriage were not satisfied.147  Article 51 
would prohibit a Kansas court from holding similarly.  Any court 
decision that bases its decision, in whole or in part, on foreign law will 
be void and unenforceable.148  Marriages “are often conducted via 
religious means and ceremonies,”149  That these are foreign or religiously 
                                                          
 138.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5104. 
 139.  BHALA, supra note 20, at 866. 
 140.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5104. 
 141.  Id. § 60-5102. 
 142.  Id. § 60-5104. 
 143.  604 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 144.  Id. at 925. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. at 925–26. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5103 (Supp. 2012). 
 149.  ACLU, NOTHING TO FEAR: DEBUNKING THE MYTHICAL “SHARIA THREAT” TO OUR 
JUDICIAL SYSTEM 3 (May 2011), available at http://www.aclu.org/religion-belief/nothing-fear-
debunking-mythical-sharia-threat-our-judicial-system. 
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based marriages does not preclude the right to have courts determine 
their validity.150 
To complicate matters, the Kansas Constitution affords more 
protection to religious freedom than the First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.151  Suppose a Kansas court, researching a foreign 
legal system, finds the foreign law grants religious freedoms tantamount 
to those granted by the United States’ Constitution but not to those 
granted by the Kansas Constitution.  What is the court to do?  Certainly 
the language, “same fundamental . . . rights and privileges granted under 
the United States and Kansas constitutions”152 seems to mandate that 
both constitutional thresholds must be met to satisfy the requirement of 
article 51.  Further, the list is not exhaustive.153  Suppose a case is 
decided correctly in a Kansas state district court utilizing a foreign legal 
code, then appealed to the Kansas Court of Appeals.  The appealing party 
then points to a constitutional ruling in the foreign system that has yet to 
be decided in the United States Supreme Court and the Kansas Supreme 
Court.  Do the “same privileges” granted under the United States and 
Kansas Constitutions have to perfectly match the foreign judgments?  If 
a foreign law has a right to privacy that is interpreted by that jurisdiction 
as the right to assisted suicide, but which the Constitution of the United 
States precludes,154 is the fact that there is a “fundamental liberty” or 
“right” of privacy—although not precisely the “same”—provided by the 
foreign jurisdiction enough to satisfy article 51’s requirements?155  There 
is no standard. 
However, even if a court finds a marriage valid, Islamic women may 
still encounter legal hurdles.  The Kansas Constitution states, “The 
legislature shall provide for the protection of the rights of women, in 
acquiring and possessing property, real, personal and mixed, separate and 
apart from the husband.”156  Women married in the Islamic tradition need 
assurance that their marriage contracts and divorces are valid and 
incorporate important principles of Sharī’a law so that a court will 
                                                          
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Stinemetz v. Kan. Health Pol’y Auth., 252 P.3d 141, 161 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011). 
 152.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5104 (emphasis added). 
 153.  See id. (stating that the list is “including, but not limited to”). 
 154.  See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (holding that there is no right to 
assisted suicide in the U.S. Constitution). 
 155.  My thanks to Professor Thomas Stacy for pointing out that the courts could emphasize the 
“fundamental liberty” found even though it may not be “the same fundamental liberty.” 
 156.  KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 6. 
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adequately and fairly divide the property upon their divorce.157 
In Islam, it is an essential aspect of the contract to marriage that the 
husband gives the wife mahr,158 a nuptial gift.  This can be a substantial 
amount of money.159  And the mahr remains with the wife regardless of 
divorce.160  If a divorce does occur, the wife may use this money to 
support herself and pay for necessary expenses.161  Because this is the 
wife’s separate property, hers for as long as she lives, it should be treated 
as such in the divorce proceeding.162 
Article 51 was explored in a recent divorce case in Johnson County, 
Kansas.  In Soleimani v. Soleimani, a man filed for divorce from his wife 
of two years who, after the marriage, emigrated from Iran.163  The mahr 
agreement provided that she was to be paid an equivalent of $677,000.164  
However, the court lacked a valid English translation of the contract and 
therefore could only interpret it by incorporating Iranian and Islamic 
law.165 
The Soleimani court struggled to find a fair solution.  The wife knew 
little English, lived in a shelter, did not have a job, and was ashamed to 
return to Iran.166  Before marrying and signing the mahr agreement, the 
husband owned $7 million in assets.167  Subsequently, during the divorce 
proceeding, he denied signing the agreement.168  The court did not 
believe him.  But because the court was precluded from interpreting the 
contract by applying Islamic law, which would grant the wife a 
substantial portion of the marital, it awarded the wife only temporary 
                                                          
 157.  See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 137, at Sec. II.C (stating that banning laws of marriage and 
divorce from being used will prevent the court from deciding if there was evidence of a marriage or 
divorce at all). 
 158.  SCHACHT, supra note 26, at 161. 
 159.  BHALA, supra note 20, at 916. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  See generally id. (discussing how the mahr is the wife’s property for her life). 
 163.  Soleimani v. Soleimani, No. 11CV4668 (Johnson Cnty. Kan. 2012), available at 
www.volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/soleimani.pdf.  This decision was publicized by the 
American Public Policy Alliance as “the first application of American Laws for American Courts.”  
American Laws for American Courts Applied in Kansas for the FirstTime!, AM. PUB. POL’Y 
ALLIANCE (Sept. 14, 2012), http://publicpolicyalliance.org/2012/09/american-laws-for-american-
courts-applied-in-kansas-for-the-first-time/.  This statement indicates that while there has been 
ALAC enacted in many states, there is little need for them. 
 164.  Soleimani, No. 11CV4668, at 15. 
 165.  Id. at 15. 
 166.  Id. at 20. 
 167.  Id. at 5, 20. 
 168.  Id. at 13. 
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maintenance $692 per month for two years.169 
Even if the contract were permitted to be interpreted, the court could 
not have honored the mahr agreement because of article 51.170  The 
court’s concern pertains to the fact that foreign jurisdictions, which 
enforce mahr agreements, do not separate church from state and allow 
for discrimination.171  The court looked only to an Indian divorce case 
from an unpublished panel decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals 
for this information.172  However, in a recent opinion from Connecticut, 
an Iranian mahr agreement was upheld based on “neutral principals of 
law” and found to be a valid contract.173  If the Soleimani court did find a 
valid contract, it would be forced to invalidate it under article 51.174  
Courts should be permitted to consider neutral principals of law to 
determine if a valid contract is formed and to interpret its provisions.175 
Kansas courts should be especially aware of mahr when deciding 
divorces between Muslims.  Other peculiarities in Sharī’a law might 
impact the decisions of Kansas family courts.  Most notably, under 
Sharī’a, there is no martial property; all assets belong either to the wife 
or to the husband.176  Second, a wife is entitled to maintenance, nafaka, 
during the marriage.177  She is not required to provide any maintenance 
for her husband, nor is she required to give any of her earnings to him.178  
And the maintenance does not end at divorce—a husband is required to 
provide for his ex-wife and children, so long as the wife is not at fault.179  
However, if the husband is poor, maintenance is not an absolute right.180 
                                                          
 169.  Id. at 13–14, 21. 
 170.  See id. at 29–31 (discussing article 51’s recent passage as a way to effectively protect 
fundamental rights that may be disguised as being protected under the Establishment Clause). 
 171.  Id. at 29 (citing Tarikonda v. Pinjari, No. 287403, 2009 WL 930007, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. 
April 7, 2009)). 
 172.  Id. at 29–30. 
 173.  Light v. Light, No. NNHFA124051863S, 2012 WL 6743605, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 
6, 2012) (“In the present case, the trial court may apply well-established principles of contract law 
and Connecticut’s Premarital Agreement Act to enforce the agreement made by the parties.”) 
 174.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5104 (Supp. 2012). 
 175.  See Light, 2012 WL 6743605, at *4–6 (discussing decisions of mahr agreements from other 
jurisdictions and applying principals of established contract law to the dispute). 
 176.  SCHACHT, supra note 26, at 167. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  BHALA, supra note 20, at 919. 
 179.  Id. at 920–21. 
 180.  Id. at 921. 
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2. Business and Financial Development 
Section 8 of article 51 exempts business entities from the 
prohibitions of article 51 if the entity contracts to subject itself to foreign 
law.181  The freedom to negotiate with foreign businesses is a “critical” 
bargaining chip.182  However, article 51 will hinder the development of 
Kansas businesses, particularly in the fields of finance and personal 
banking, regardless of the business exemption. 
Article 51 inhibits the freedom to contract.  The Contract Clause of 
the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o State shall . . . pass 
any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”183  Use of Sharī’a-
compliant financial tools is on the rise.184  Under Sharī’a law, banks and 
other lenders are not allowed to charge interest—riba— on principal 
loaned.185  Rather, a fee for the privilege of using the money for the loan 
is assessed on the principal, divided by the number of payments, and then 
added to the interval payment amount.186  Typically, a business loan may 
be repaid by paying the principal of the loan and a percentage of profits 
over time.187  With a successful business, a lending agent could make 
much more by assessing a fee on the profits collected rather than 
collecting interest on the loan amount.188 
Some U.S. investors have realized the potential profit.189  One such 
investor, University Bank, is “the first subsidiary of its kind in the United 
States and plans to offer mortgage[s]” that are Sharī’a compliant.190  The 
                                                          
 181.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5108 (Supp. 2012). 
 182.  AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 137, at Sec. I. 
 183.  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1. 
 184.  See, e.g., Kimberly J. Tacy, Islamic Finance: A Growing Industry in the United States, 10 
N.C. BANKING INST. 355 (2006) (providing a history of Islamic finance and its successes and 
challenges within the United States). 
 185.  See MURAT ÇIZAKÇA, ISLAMIC CAPITALISM AND FINANCE 11–12 (2011) (providing a brief 
summary on interest prohibition in Islamic finance); see also Qur’an, The Cow, 2:275–281, at 31–32, 
The Family of ‘Imran, 3:130–132, at 44, Women, 4:160–161, at 65, The Byzantines, 30:39, at 259 
(M.A.S. Abdel Haleem trans., 2004); BHALA, supra note 20, at 679 (“These passages easily explain 
acceptance among the fukaha’ [jurists] of the prohibition of riba.”). 
 186.  BHALA, supra note 20, at 732–33. 
 187.  Id. at 728–29. 
 188.  See id. at 711 (stating that under a Sharia-compliant loan, the lender is a partner in the 
business venture and thus entitled to a percentage of the profits, “not a return fixed contractually as a 
percentage of the principal value of the initial loan”). 
 189.  See Abdi Shayesteh, Analysis: Islamic Banks in the United States: Breaking Through the 
Barriers, NEWHORIZON (Apr. 1, 2009), http://www.newhorizon-islamicbanking.com/index.cfm? 
action=view&id=10776&section=features (discussing the advantages of Islamic finance in 
America). 
 190.  Tacy, supra note 189, at 355, 366. 
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bank believes it could double its assets.191 
However, banks and financial transactions must be structured 
differently to capitalize on this trend.  If a banking institution is to offer 
Sharī’a-compliant investments and financial services, it must satisfy 
several conditions.  In addition to the general rules of corporate 
governance, a religious board—consisting mostly of Islamic scholars—
must scrutinize transactions, loans, and investments to ensure that these 
are in compliance with Sharī’a investment principles.192 
Typically, large lending agreements between an Islamic bank and a 
borrower are a sharikah al-mudarabah, a “sleeping partnership.”193  This 
is the classical way in which most large-scale purchases are financed 
under Sharī’a law for finance and business purposes.194  Smaller, 
consumer purchases are contracted in a murabaha contract.195  Under a 
murabaha contract, a bank and an individual enter into a “cost-plus-
profit” agreement.196  First, the bank buys the asset in its own name.197  
The bank then calculates its profit mark-up in agreement with the 
individual.198  This represents the risk the bank undertakes in the 
transaction.199  The consumer then purchases the asset at the cost-plus 
price as a fixed price or as scheduled payments.200  While this transaction 
may seem unnecessary, it is essential under Islamic financing to avoid 
interest being paid.201  A religious board within the bank reviews all 
transactions and contracts entered into by the bank to ensure Sharī’a law 
compliance.202  If investment and lending practices are not Sharī’a law 
compliant, the banks could lose their Islamic banking credentials and 
business.203 
                                                          
 191.  Id. 
 192.  Todd Williams, Islamic Legal Authority in a Non-Muslim Society: Designing The Islamic 
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 195.  See id. at 728–29. 
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CONTRACTS 33 (2012). 
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official body that regulates the Islamic banking industry, indices like the Dow Jones Islamic Indices 
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If Bank enters into a Sharī’a-compliant mortgage contract with A 
and A defaults on the mortgage, Bank would not have a valid contract.  
Section 4 of article 51 mandates that if a foreign legal code is “to govern 
some or all of the disputes between the parties,” the contract is void and 
unenforceable.204  And if the contract utilizes any foreign law that 
“includes or incorporates any substantive or procedural law . . . that 
would not grant the parties the same” constitutional rights Kansas 
citizens have, the contract is void.205  Section 8 of article 51, the business 
exemption, is inapplicable in this instance.  Business entities are exempt 
only if they are contracting to be subject to foreign law or courts outside 
the United States.206  Here, Bank is subjecting itself to the location where 
the contracting took place: Kansas. 
But an Islamic finance contract must adhere to the principles of 
Sharī’a, much like how a common law contract must pertain to lawful 
subject matter.207  Article 51 would invalidate the mortgage contract 
described above because of the substantive aspects of Sharī’a law it 
incorporates. 
Further, suppose that Corp—an Islamic company expanding into 
Kansas—wants to buy land and begin operations.  If Bank offers Corp a 
Sharī’a-compliant loan, the amount of the loan will surely require Bank 
and Corp to enter into a sharikah al-mudarabah.208  If Corp’s account 
defaults, or Corp engages in practices that are not Sharī’a compliant, the 
contract is breached.209  The Bank’s religious board may then convene an 
arbitration panel to decide the dispute.210  The board may apply a 
“mixture of national law and Shariah principles.”211  The problem now 
arises whether the sharikah al-mudarabah is a partnership subjected to 
foreign law.  Arguably, this arrangement is a domestic agreement 
                                                                                                                       
 
have a Sharī’a law advisory board that ensures included securities comply with certain Islamic 
financing standards.  Id. at 12; see also Shari’ah Supervisory Board, S&P DOW JONES, https://www 
.djindexes.com/islamicmarket/?go=supervisory-board (last visited Mar. 18, 2013) (describing the 
Islamic Supervisory Board and giving a brief biography of its members). 
 204.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5104 (Supp. 2012). 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Id. § 60-5108. 
 207.  See ELKHATIB, supra note 196, at 15, 16 (“[T]he subject matter of the contract must be 
legal and not prohibited under Shariah law.”). 
 208.  See BHALA, supra note 20, at 634 (explaining that sharikah al-mudarabah partnerships are 
commonplace in Muslim countries and is the most common lending transaction that is Sharī’a 
compliant). 
 209.  See ELKHATIB, supra note 196, at 62 (noting that businesses must not do business that is 
forbidden by Sharī’a law). 
 210.  Julio C. Colon, Choice of Law and Islamic Finance, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 411, 419 (2011). 
 211.  Id. 
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utilizing aspects of Sharī’a’ law.  This is similar to the hypothetical 
mortgage contract between A and Bank.  The contract formed between 
Corp and Bank is also a domestic agreement.  Bank is a corporation, but 
it is not subjecting itself to foreign laws or courts.  Bank needs the 
application of Kansas’s laws to exhaust its remedies to collect the debt.  
Article 51 would then void the contract under section 4 because terms of 
the mortgage and loan with Corp were Sharī’a based.  And finally, 
complications arise because of the arbitration board utilized by Bank. 
3. Arbitration Agreements and Provisions 
Religious-based arbitration is not a novel concept.  Islamic-
compliant financial transactions often include an arbitration provision.212  
Frequently, courts within the United States have allowed arbitrations to 
proceed under religious rules such as the Rules of Procedure for 
Christian Conciliation, where disputing parties agree to mediate disputes 
guided by Holy Scriptures.213  A Texas Court of Appeals found that state 
and federal law favor arbitration, even if the arbitration is before a 
Sharī’a tribunal.214  Nevertheless, article 51 invalidates all contracts and 
financial agreements that allow for alternative dispute resolution because 
the business entity is allowing this provision to govern a dispute in the 
contract.215 
Legislating away Islamic arbitration provisions, agreements, or 
awards, is not a simple task.  One complication is article 51’s 
relationship with the United States Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, 
which provides that the United States Constitution “shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land.”216  This includes treaties.217  Article 51 bans 
“international law,” which encompasses treaties made by the United 
States that are self-executing and directly applicable to state courts.218  
Kansas residents are not removed from international affairs or treaties.  
For example, the New York Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) is an 
                                                          
 212.  Id. at 411, 413. 
 213.  See Charles P. Trumbull, Islamic Arbitration: A New Path For Interpreting Islamic Legal 
Contracts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 609, 623–24 (2006) (discussing the increasing frequency of 
enforcement of religious-based alternative dispute resolution clauses). 
 214.  Jabri v. Qaddura, 108 S.W.3d 404, 413 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003). 
 215.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5104 (Supp. 2012). 
 216.  U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 217.  AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 137, at Sec. II.A. 
 218.  See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504–05 (2008) (holding that self-executing 
treaties and treaties implemented by statute are binding on the states). 
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international treaty joined by the United States and many Muslim 
countries.219  This treaty governs disputes between residents and parties 
outside the United States unless expressly disclaimed by both parties to 
the transaction.220  A “state constitutional amendment or statutory 
provision that prohibited” applying the New York Convention in a 
proceeding before a state court would violate the Supremacy Clause.221  
Section 3 of article 51 requires that “[a]ny court [or] arbitration . . . 
ruling or decision shall violate the public policy of this state and be void 
and unenforceable if” the court’s ruling is based “in whole or in part on 
any foreign law, legal code[,] or system.”222  Essentially, an arbitration 
award properly awarded pursuant to the terms of the New York 
Convention is enforceable. 
However, ALAC legislation like article 51 could give state courts an 
opportunity to deny enforcement these provisions.  State courts could 
broadly interpret what a “foreign law” is under ALAC legislation.  
Article 51 states that a “foreign law” is anything that is a “law, legal code 
or system of a jurisdiction outside of any state or territory of the United 
States, including, but not limited to, international organizations . . . and 
applied by that jurisdiction’s courts, administrative bodies or other 
formal or informal tribunals.”223 
Arbitration decisions under the New York Convention cannot be 
overturned simply by citing a public policy exception or because the 
ruling was based on Islamic law.  In TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta 
S.P.,224 the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit stated, “The test of 
public policy cannot be simply whether the courts of a secondary State 
would set aside an arbitration award if the award had been made and 
enforcement had been sought within its jurisdiction.”225  The court noted, 
however, that there is a “public policy gloss” on article V(1)(e) of the 
New York Convention.226  But to be overturned the judgment must be 
“repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just in the 
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United States.”227  Indeed, while the New York Convention allows a 
public policy exception, the exception has been read “narrowly.”228 
An arbitration award made pursuant to the New York Convention is 
enforceable regardless of article 51’s provisions.  Federal laws supersede 
state law, and when state and federal laws conflict, federal law 
prevails.229  State laws that prohibit arbitration enforcement because of 
the use of foreign laws essentially “have the effect of managing relations 
with another country because foreign relations is the exclusive province 
of the federal government—specifically the President and Congress.”230 
D. Public Policy Issues 
Article 51 raises some public policy concerns.  Namely, Kansans and 
United States citizens have the right to contract freely,231 and the Kansas 
courts should have free and full discretion when deciding a case.  Kansas 
courts have recognized the public policy right to contract freely.232  And 
this right should not be interfered with “lightly.”233  Article 51 states that 
the right to contract can be circumvented when there is a “state[] interest 
to protect and promote rights and privileges” of the U.S. and Kansas 
Constitutions.234  Senator Marci Francisco stated that she believed this 
provision to be unfair, and that article 51 provided corporations a greater 
freedom to contract than individuals.235  It is unjust for courts to be 
permitted to interpret contracts incorporating foreign law for businesses 
but not for individuals.  Courts should be available to people first, not 
business entities.  Individuals are able to protect and promote their own 
rights—a business entity is no more intelligent, and no less vulnerable. 
Several experts in Islamic and international law have signaled 
warnings about article 51’s potential impact.236  The most notable 
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warning is American Bar Association Resolution 113A.237  The report 
cited two main concerns: (1) the ALAC acts have enormous 
constitutional concerns, and (2) the U.S. Constitution already protects 
individual rights and freedoms.238  While article 51 does not explicitly 
name Sharī’a law, the intent behind the law is evident.  Foreign countries 
will not want to negotiate or enter into contracts with Kansas companies.  
Though it could be argued that article 51 does not extend to business 
entities, foreign businesses do not have to do more than a simple Internet 
search to find the intent of the law and decide not to transact business in 
a discriminatory state.  Those entities might further discover that 
legislators have urged that although article 51 does not apply to Sharī’a 
law per se, it does pertain to international law.  Or, if a close business 
relationship is forged in the wake of article 51, the parties might be 
hesitant to bring foreign-domiciled workers to Kansas.  As discussed, 
companies might worry that an employee’s marriage, divorce 
agreements, or other contracts might be invalidated if challenged.239 
The United States Constitution is not in danger of losing its ability to 
protect the citizens of the United States.  There is no need for article 51 
and ALAC provisions.  Article 51 questions the integrity of the Kansas 
courts and instructs judges about what is appropriate law.240  Article 51 
dictates “the scope of [judges’] enforcement powers . . . [and] their 
ability to consider in their deliberations” certain laws and “potentially 
informative sources in order to reach the best outcomes in the cases 
before them.”241  Courts already will not follow a choice-of-law 
provision if it will violate the state or federal public policy.242  And in 
several cases dealing with aspects of Sharī’a law, courts have declined to 
apply the decision of foreign courts because of violations to public 
policy.243  It seems that the Kansas Legislature does not trust state courts 
to construe fair rulings, to find out what is equitable, or to follow 
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provisions the parties agreed to in a contract. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Certainly, after the attacks of September 11, 2001, Americans felt a 
deep-rooted sense of patriotism emerge.  Alongside this, Americans also 
felt a fear of the unknown.  This fear has spurred wide instances of 
Islamophobia throughout the country.244  While the Kansas Legislature 
may have felt threatened by radical Islamic terrorists or influence from 
Islamic culture when it passed article 51, such fears do not justify 
passing a bill that has such far-reaching potential to undermine the daily 
lives of Americans—regardless if they are Muslim or not.  The law’s 
broad and expansive language could have far more unintended 
consequences than were within the scope of this Note. 
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